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Abstract
This paper builds on the Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) model
of deregulation. We concentrate on product market to construct
a framework explaining in a more nuanced way the redistribu-
tive e⁄ects of deregulation between sectors and within the same
sector, and possible oppositions to this policy by ￿rms and work-
ers. In a general equilibrium framework, we introduce two sectors
(regulated and unregulated), heterogeneity in ￿rms￿productivity,
and a ￿xed cost of entry. In such a context e⁄ects of deregu-
lation policies can be ambiguous depending on some parametric
restrictions, and sometime counterproductive. As a result, dereg-
ulation policies are not always welfare improving: a deregulation
action will succeed in increasing competition and reducing mark
up when the economy is already partially deregulated (su¢ ciently
high level of competition), but may achieve the opposite outcome
when it is highly regulated. Additionally, we study the choice of
the best policy instrument and the optimal sequencing in the use
of instruments.
1 Introduction1
As pointed out by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) reduction and redis-
tribution of rents are the heart of any deregulation policy. It seems to be
1This project was started when Marco Arnone was an Economist at the Monetary
and Financial System Department of the International Monetary Fund. We wish to
thank Luigi Bonatti, Stefano Bosi, Luigi Campiglio, Jordi Gali, Bernard Laurens, An-
dreu Mas-Colell, Giuseppina Malerba, Marco Mazzoli, Alessandro Prati, Alessandro
Rebucci, Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Martin Sommer for helpful suggestions and comments.
Opinions expressed re￿ ect only those of the authors. Errors are ours alone. Appen-
dices mentioned in the paper are available upon request (marco.arnone@yahoo.com,
ferdinando.scalise@unicatt.it).
1very important to understand in depth the mechanisms and outcomes
of such policies, ￿rst of all ￿to clarify political economy constraints on
deregulation￿ 2, and to choose the best policy instruments to introduce it
into markets. This point turns out to be crucial if we consider that such
policies are claimed as necessary and fundamental to improve economic
performances of di⁄erent countries3.
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) build up a general equilibrium model
with regulation in both labor and product market: in the ￿rst a policy
maker can act to reduce contractual strength of workers in the wage
bargaining with ￿rms, while in the second s/he can increase competition,
through an increase in elasticity of demand (only in the short run), and
reduce the entry cost for ￿rms (proportional to output, only in the long
run). The result is a claim for a coordination of the two policies to win
the oppositions of workers, possible at least in the short run, because of
the reduction of their rent; in addition, deregulation is able to reduce
unemployment and should be widespread. As a result in Blanchard and
Giavazzi (2003) deregulation is always welfare improving.
This paper embeds the Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) model; we
concentrate on product market deregulation to construct a framework
to explain in a more nuanced way redistributive e⁄ects of such a policy
between sectors and within the same sector and possible oppositions to
it by ￿rms and workers; also, we try to study the choice of the best policy
instrument to use and the optimal sequencing in the use of instruments.
We introduce two sectors (one regulated and the other unregulated), het-
erogeneity in ￿rms￿productivity and a ￿xed cost of entry in a general
equilibrium framework very similar to that in Blanchard and Giavazzi
(2003). However, unlike Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), in such a con-
text e⁄ects of deregulation policies can be ambiguous depending on some
parametric restrictions, and sometime counterproductive. As a result,
deregulation policies are not always welfare improving; when implement-
ing deregulation policies, policy makers should consider the choice of the
appropriate policy instrument for any given set of parameters: a dereg-
ulation action will succeed in increasing competition and reducing mark
up when the economy is already partially deregulated (su¢ ciently high
level of competition), but may achieve the opposite outcome when it is
highly regulated.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 1 we present the model
and the equilibrium conditions; in Section 2 we analyze partial equi-
librium e⁄ects of deregulation in product market (i.e. an increase in
elasticity and a reduction in the variable cost of regulation), assuming
2See Blanchard and Giavazzi (2005).
3See, for example, Gersbach (1999).
2entry/exit decisions as given, while in Section 3 we will discuss general
equilibrium outcomes of the di⁄erent policies (i.e. an increase in elas-
ticity, a reduction in the variable regulation cost and a reduction in the
￿xed entry cost) making the number of ￿rms in the market endogenous.
2 The Model
In the economy there are L homogeneous consumers-workers (we assume
no capital and saving); they are owners of existing ￿rms and have pref-
erences given by a Cobb-Douglas utility function on an homogeneous




￿ can be thought of as produced by a manufacturing sector ￿ and
S as services o⁄ered by sector S .
As it is simple to verify that utility is increasing and concave with
respect to consumption; labor does not enter the function, so e⁄ort does
not give disutility to agents: as a result they always o⁄er on the market
their entire labor endowment (that can be normalized to 1). Firms are
assumed to be risk neutral and so pro￿t maximizers.
Sector S is deregulated, perfectly competitive and uses labor as its
only production factor (all ￿rms in this sector have the same produc-
tivity); workers receive a wage given by their marginal product value,
which in equilibrium is equal to the good price, PS.
Sector ￿ is regulated and ￿rms are heterogeneous with respect to
productivity (’): heterogeneity is represented by a probability distribu-
tion ￿(’), de￿ned on a subset of the positive semi-axis. Prices of each
variety (indexed by the productivity of the ￿rm ’), wages and employ-
ment for the ￿rm are determined after a privately e¢ cient bargaining
process: workers￿contractual strength is ￿ and re￿ ect any aspect of la-
bor market regulation which increases the bargaining power of workers,
ranging, for example, from the existence and the nature of "extensions
agreements", to closed-shop arrangements, to the rules on the right of
strike. Workers can freely move between and within sectors.
As in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) we assume this type of bar-
gaining because we want to capture the possibility that ￿rms may not
be operating on their demand for labor; we want also to allow for the
fact that, when there are rents stronger workers (higher ￿) may be able
to obtain a higher wage without su⁄ering a decrease in employment,
at least in the short run. E¢ cient bargaining delivers that implication
3but any assumption which relaxes the link between the wage and the
marginal product of labor could qualitatively yield similar results.
We go further by introducing two types of regulation costs: a pro-
portional cost b, that can be interpreted as deriving from bureaucracy
(for example, a reduction in b may come from relaxing accounting re-
quirements for ￿rms) and a ￿xed cost f to enter the market; the latter
is formalized as an opportunity cost, and is relevant only on the gen-
eral equilibrium4. It can be thought of as state monopoly or more in
general as any barrier that can take the form of legal or administrative
restriction on entry. The introduction of a ￿xed cost of entry, together
with heterogeneity in ￿rms￿productivity, delivers non trivial results in
the general equilibrium and substantially changes e⁄ects of deregulation
policies.
Standard consumer optimization implies that aggregate demand for









where I is total nominal income in the economy, ￿ is the elasticity
of substitution between goods, p(’) is the price of the good, and P￿ is













Given that in equilibrium not all entrepreneurs will ￿nd production
pro￿table, the price index consider only varieties from the cuto⁄ pro-
ducer ’￿ onwards. This implies that ’￿ can be used as an inverse measure
of the mass of producers existing in equilibrium5, and as a consequence,
￿ can be viewed as a function of the productivity cuto⁄:
￿ = ￿ ￿g (’￿) (4)
where g0 (’￿) < 0, even when for ease of notation this dependence will
not be made explicit. ￿ ￿ re￿ ects another dimension of product market
regulation (and another policy instrument). For example, in the con-
text of European integration, decreases in ￿ ￿ may re￿ ect the elimination
4Further discussion on the reasons for this choice will be given in section 4.
5This is a consequence of the static nature of the framework. More complex
analysis could embody a dynamic version along the lines of Hopenhayn (1992) or
Melitz (2003).
4of tari⁄ barriers, or standardization measures making it easier to sell
domestic products in other European Union countries.
Surplus for a ￿rm with productivity ’ is given by6:





























while surplus for workers of this ￿rm is the total excess of their salary
(w(’)) on the reservation wage (wS) i.e. the wage they could obtain in
the deregulated sector S:
V (’) = [w(’) ￿ wS]
b
’










Maximizing the total surplus function ￿ logV (’) + (1 ￿ ￿)log￿ (’)
it is shown in Appendix A.1 that wages and prices will be set up at:













as usual it is assumed that ￿ > 1, to rule out trivial results.
Privately e¢ cient bargaining together with workers￿surplus as spec-
i￿ed in equation (8) leads to wages equal for all workers independently
of the productivity of the ￿rm they work in: as expected wages are a
constant mark-up over the reservation wage7.
Productivity, however, a⁄ects pricing: the greater ’, the lesser the
price charged by the ￿rm; it is also clear that proportional regulation
costs add a burden that directly translates into higher price for each














In words, one unit of output can be produced using 1
’ unit of labor and so cost
w(’)
’ ; however, ￿rms must also bear regulation cost b, and so one unit of output
actually requires b
’ unit of labor to be produced.
7This is a consequence of the risk neutrality of ￿rms and risk aversion of con-
sumers, assumed above. It would be interesting to study the implications of assuming
risk aversion for ￿rms, as a more realistic assumptions in developing countries.
5variety. It is interesting to note that for ￿ ! 0 (i.e. very small contrac-
tual strength of workers) or for ￿ ! 1 (i.e. very competitive product
market) the wage converges to its reservation (competitive) level.
Moreover, higher productivity does have an e⁄ect on labor, through


















So higher productivity ￿rms will hire more labor; they will also have
larger revenues and pro￿ts (see Appendix A.1).
3 Partial equilibrium
In the partial equilibrium we take the number of ￿rms as given and so
the mass of producers in sector ￿ is ￿xed by de￿nition at 1 ￿ G(’￿);
apart from exogenous variations in ￿ ￿, the elasticity ￿ is ￿xed as well. It
is possible to show that within this framework, in sector ￿, consumer
expenditure is always equal to total payments to all factors8. The only
market for which an equilibrium must be imposed in the partial equilib-
rium is the labor market.
If the production function in sector S is simply S = LS, (where






Normalizing the sector S price to 1, wage wS will also be equal to 1,
all variables can be expressed in terms of units of homogeneous good (or
units of salary in sector S), and labor input requirement is
LS = (1 ￿ ￿)I (11)
In order to compute labor requirements for sector ￿, it is necessary
to give an explicit form to the productivity distribution ￿(’): So in
what follows9 it is assumed that:
8The main reason for this result is the absence of ￿xed costs of production. To
ceck it, it is necessary to integrate pro￿ts and total wages per ￿rms along all ￿rms
producing in the short run, for a given productivity distribution ￿(’) (or simply
integrating revenues for each ￿rm): expression that results is always ￿I, which is
total nominal expenditure by consumers, given Cobb-Douglas preferences.
9In Axtell (2001) it is shown that the distribution of ￿rms￿size as measured by
revenues can be approximated with a Pareto; given that in the class of models to



















where it has been assumed that ￿ > (￿ ￿ 1)11. We also show that
(see Appendix A.2) labor requirement in sector ￿ is given by:




where L represents the labor force.
Equations (11) and (14) constitute a simple system of two equations
in two unknowns, L￿ which implies LS, and nominal income I; the














A fraction of total labor force is hired by the regulated sector￿ s ￿rms,
while the other is absorbed by perfectly competitive producers12; in the
model there is no unemployment, but only di⁄erent division of rents.
It is interesting to note that for ￿ ! 1 (minimum level of competition
in sector ￿) LS ! L: this means that all the labor force is hired by
the competitive sector. On the other hand when ￿ ! 1, L￿ ! ￿L
that is the perfect competition employment level in sector ￿, given the
Cobb-Douglas utility function.
3.1 E⁄ects of deregulation in the goods market in
partial equilibrium
3.1.1 An increase in the elasticity of substitution (￿ ￿)
Because ￿rms￿mass is ￿xed variations in ￿ ￿ do not lead to entry or
exit, and so an increase unambiguously leads to higher ￿: prices of
all varieties decrease (because of the increase in competition), as well
as relative nominal wages in sector ￿; it is interesting to note that the
greater the bargaining power of workers, the heavier the drop in nominal
Pareto distribution (with parameter ￿ and initial point in 1) is a good approximation.
The same reasoning is found in Helpman (2003).
11This assumption implies that (￿￿1)￿th uncentered moment of the distribution
is ￿nite, and this is common in this class of models. See for example Melitz (2003).
12In fact
￿(1￿￿)
￿￿￿ < 1 follows directly by the assumption that ￿ > 1 and ￿ > 0.
7wages13. Moreover, P￿ becomes smaller and real wages increase (see
Appendix A.2.1). This policy measure has also e⁄ect on distribution of
workforce between the sectors and within the same sector. As can be
















and so an increase in ￿ raises total employment in sector ￿, reallocat-
ing workers from S to ￿ (given that L remains unchanged). However,
￿rm level e⁄ects on employment are not the same for all ￿rms and for
all values of ￿. Substituting P￿ and I in equation (9) it can be shown









￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
￿
(17)
Di⁄erentiating (17) with respect to ￿, it is found in Appendix A.2.1
that @
@￿n(’￿) is positive only if ￿ is su¢ ciently low, i.e. for:




￿ + 1 ￿ ￿ (18)
When the starting value of ￿ is greater than this threshold, more
competition driven by an increase in ￿ ￿ lead to a reduction in employ-






this also means that employment drops also for ￿rms su¢ ciently near
the marginal one in terms of productivity. However, given that total
employment in the sector grows there is a reallocation of employment
from less productive ￿rms to more productive ones, besides labor shift
across sectors.
Total wages to workers in sector ￿ increase or decrease depending on










In particular, su¢ ciently high bargaining power for workers leads to
a decrease in total wages paid in the sector following an increase in ￿:
Turning our attention to real pro￿ts, a rather peculiar e⁄ect of changes
￿ ￿ is identi￿ed , namely, an increase in ￿ raises real pro￿ts of the cuto⁄
￿rm only if the starting value of ￿ is su¢ ciently low, i.e., if there is
enough monopoly power; otherwise, an increase in competition lowers
13The higher the bargaining power of workers, the further the wage from its com-
petitive level, the heavier the drop following an increase in competition.
8revenues and pro￿ts more than the price index, and so the marginal ￿rm
looses in real terms (see Appendix A.2.1 for proof and the graph) 14.
This fact could explain opposition and lobbying against deregulation
from less productive ￿rms: they try to protect their rents from compe-
tition. Moreover, if we assume of some form of "cost transition between
sectors and ￿rms" for workers, the comparison between this cost and the
gain in terms of real wage will determine their attitude with respect to
deregulation: in particular, if the reallocation cost is su¢ ciently high,
it is possible that they agree with their employers in contrasting the
process, making possible the creation a sort of ￿stopping block￿made
of entrepreneurs and labor union. It is crucial to take into account these
possible redistributive e⁄ects when choosing the policy instrument to
14Additionaly, given that ￿r(’) = ￿r(’￿)(
’
’￿)￿￿1 (where ￿r(’) =
￿(’)
P￿ ), if existing
monopoly power is high, all ￿rms gain from the deregulation process; on the contrary,
if ￿ is bigger than the threshold, only ￿rms with greater productivity obtain an
increase in real pro￿ts (those for which
’
’￿ increases more than the reduction in
￿r(’)).
9introduce deregulation in a product market.
3.1.2 A decrease in the proportional cost of regulation (b)
As shown, proportional costs of regulation add a burden for unit pro-
duced, transforming a ￿rm with productivity ’ in one with productivity
’
b.
A deregulation policy implemented through a reduction in b will have
no counterintuitive e⁄ects. First of all, it will lead to lower prices, con-
sidering that ￿rms can apply mark up on lower marginal costs; as a
consequence, price index in sector ￿ (eq. (13)) unambiguously declines.
This reduction in b has two opposite e⁄ects on nominal pro￿ts: they
gets higher because of the increase in the actual productivity, but gets
lower because a reduction in the price index is equivalent to a worsening
in the relative competitive position; however, the ￿nal e⁄ect on nominal
pro￿ts is zero (nominal pro￿ts15 do not depend on b) but real pro￿ts
increase for all ￿rms. Bargaining rule will allow nominal wages to reap
no bene￿ts, but nonetheless workers also gain because of a reduction in
the price index, which raises real wages as well. It is possible to conclude
that, at least in the short term, the reduction of the variable cost of
regulation seems a better policy instrument to foster deregulation.
4 E⁄ects of deregulation in general equilibrium
Decision to enter or exit the market is taken by ￿rms comparing real
pro￿t with real costs;in this context the latter are modelled as ￿xed op-
portunity costs borne at the time of entry16. With heterogeneous ￿rms,
real pro￿ts are di⁄erent for each ￿rm and this means that a proportional
cost is not able to identify a minimum cuto⁄ productivity below which
production is not convenient: this is the reason for modelling this (op-
portunity) regulation cost as independent from output (therefore, from
productivity). The choice of an opportunity cost is made as usual in or-
der to keep the accounting for labor requirement between sectors simple.
In general equilibrium, the condition that determines a cuto⁄ pro-
ductivity ’￿
17 (by equating real pro￿ts to the ￿xed entry cost f) must
15As shown in Appendix XX, equation (50).
16This could be done comparing costs of entry to present value of future pro￿ts
￿ ow, or by thinking of f as a ￿xed opportunity cost. These two formulations seem to
be equivalent because di⁄erences would follow by an exogenous (and here neglected)
discount factor that should be included in the model.
17As a consequence it will ￿x a mass of producers and an elasticity of substitution.
10be such that:
￿(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)L
b￿(￿ ￿ ￿)
￿







￿ ￿ f =0 (20)
This function p(’￿;￿(￿ ￿;’￿);f;b) = 0 implicitly relates productivity
cuto⁄, regulation costs and elasticity of substitution in such a way that
real pro￿t for the cuto⁄ ￿rm is zero. In order to make inferences about
changes in productivity cuto⁄ and elasticity following di⁄erent policy
measures, it would be necessary to take a number of derivatives of this
equation. But this rapidly reveals a hard task. In order to extract some
causal relations, an unusual approach will be adopted: with regard to
the function ￿ = ￿ ￿g (’￿), the study will be conducted only in two cases:
when ￿ is insensitive to variations in ’￿ (i.e., g0 (’￿) ! 0￿) and when
￿ is very sensitive to variations in ’￿ (i.e., g0 (’￿) ! ￿1); nonetheless
this will give a number of relevant hints, from which it is possible to
deduce policy e⁄ects in intermediate cases in which monotonicity and
continuity are assumed.




p(’￿;￿(￿ ￿;’￿);f;b) = p
0




Real pro￿ts of the cuto⁄ ￿rm change following a variation in ’￿
through two channels: because of the shift in cuto⁄productivity ’￿, and
because this shift will in general change the elasticity of substitution for
all ￿rms, and so also for the cuto⁄ producer.
As shown in the graph, partial derivative of real pro￿ts with respect
to ￿ is positive till ￿+, and is negative thereafter: therefore e⁄ects of
deregulation polices in general equilibrium will depend on the starting
value of ￿ (as seen before for the partial equilibrium). Also, we need to
consider the e⁄ect of the non-linear term g(’￿) on ￿: for low values of
￿ (precisely for ￿ < ￿
+ =
(2￿￿1)
(￿￿1) ) an increase in ’￿ will lead to lower
real pro￿ts, i.e. p0
’￿ < 0; while for ￿ > ￿
+ this derivative is positive.
It can be the case that either ￿+ < ￿
+ or ￿+ > ￿
+ 18. This taxonomy
presented in table 1 is relevant because, for intermediate level of ￿ ,
18Given that ￿+ is increasing in ’￿ and that a greater ’￿ implies a stricter selection
among producers and then a higher observed productivity in the sector, the case in
which ￿+ < ￿
+ can be labelled ￿lower productivity￿case, while ￿+ > ￿
+ ￿higher
productivity￿ one.
11the derivatives take di⁄erent signs, and so deregulation policies lead to
di⁄erent outcomes19 (while in the other cases signs are the same).
In such a context in order to deduce the e⁄ects of any deregulation
policy one has to locate the economic system in the matrix of 4 rows (low,
intermediate, and high ￿; lower and higher productivity) by 2 columns
(insensitive elasticity, very sensitive elasticity) presented in table 2.
As it will be shown in the next two sub-sections, e⁄ects of the same
deregulation policy can be quite di⁄erent depending on the values of the
policy coe¢ cients, and this richness is believed to be the main contribu-
tion that heterogeneity can add to the understanding of the topic.
4.1 A reduction in ￿xed regulation cost
By di⁄erentiating (20) with respect to ’￿ and f, the total e⁄ect on the











’￿ + ￿ ￿p0
￿g0 (’￿)
(22)








19Even if the actual intervals that identify ￿intermediate￿values for ￿ are di⁄er in
the two cases, this can be overlooked in a ￿rst approximation, given that the aim is
to stress only di⁄erent directions in total e⁄ects.
12Substituting signs of relevant derivatives in the 8 cases in which the
economic system can be located in the matrix presented in table 2:
This table is a summary of two detailed ones that can be found in
Appendix A.3 (to which reference can be made for all results here stated),
in which magnitudes are also reported. When an e⁄ect is marked as
> 0, it means that it is signi￿cantly (mathematically) bounded away
from zero, in comparison to a label like 0+, in which the e⁄ect is positive
but not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. Results of this analysis are
qualitatively equivalent to those for a reduction in b20, given that in any
case the signs of the derivatives are the same.
The ￿rst point to make is that in all cases there is a trade-o⁄between
e⁄ect on average productivity and elasticity. Given that the economy is
always moving along the same curve ￿ = ￿ ￿g(’￿), policies that increase
aggregate productivity through a selection e⁄ect on ’￿ reduce ￿rms￿
mass and lower elasticity of substitution, i.e. increase monopoly power of
surviving producers; on the other hand, policies that succeed in raising ￿
allow new entrants in the sector. However, new ￿rms are less productive
than incumbents21, therefore average measured productivity is lower in
the new equilibrium.
The degree of sensitiveness of ￿ is a measure of this trade-o⁄: when
elasticity of substitution is insensitive with respect to variations in the
mass of ￿rms, there is room for adjustments in the number of produc-
ers (but, of course, there is not for ￿); on the other side, when ￿ is
20Reported in Appendix XX. In this set up there is not an explicit ￿xed cost of
production, therefore no economies of scale emerge; this is why the equivalence holds.
In a broader set up, results may be di⁄erent in the two cases.
21Because those who were able to produce at a pro￿t were already doing so.
13highly sensitive, adjustments take place through it, and almost without
e⁄ect on ’￿. Also, a reduction in f can have quite di⁄erent outcomes
depending on where the system is located with respect to the relevant
dimensions: for instance, a reduction can raise aggregate productivity
(and this will also imply lower price index, given that ￿ does not change)
if the economy is in the insensitive, low ￿ region, but can cause aggregate
productivity to fall if ￿ is already high.
In order to discuss a deregulation process through this policy, it is
crucial to make an assumption about the shape of g(’￿), namely, if it is
convex or concave at the origin. If g(’￿) is a convex function, then low
values of ￿ are likely to be found in the insensitive region. In this case,
deregulation forces a number of ￿rms out of the market and implies a
(negligible) decrease in ￿. In the opposite case, if g(’￿) is a concave
function, a heavily regulated sector may be found in a region with very
sensitive elasticity to the mass of producers: deregulation will lead to
a slight exit of ￿rms from the market, immediately compensated by an
increase in monopoly power of surviving producers, i.e., a further reduc-
tion in ￿. For intermediate cases, these two e⁄ects have di⁄erent relative
magnitudes, but nonetheless their direction is preserved: the main result
is that if deregulation wants to pursue a reduction in monopoly power of
￿rms, the low ￿ area is a sort of ￿trap￿ , a no improvement region for this
kind of policy. Its e⁄ect is to worsen the situation: as a consequence, a
reduction in f is not a good starting point. This region extends also to
intermediate values of ￿ (it extends to the insensitive region, if aggregate
productivity is low; it extends to the very sensitive region, if aggregate
productivity is high), making application of this policy particularly di¢ -
cult. If one is not sure about the location of the economy, implementing
this policy may reveal counterproductive. Only for high values of ￿ (and
sensitive elasticity function, i.e. a convex g(’￿)) this policy leads to a re-
duction in the monopoly power of ￿rms, but at expenses of lower average
productivity.
4.2 An increase in the elasticity of substitution (￿ ￿)










p’￿ + ￿ ￿p￿g0(’￿)
p￿ (24)





p’￿ + ￿ ￿p￿g0(’￿)
p’￿ (25)
14Working out signs in the 8 cases in which the economic system can
be located, the relevant matrix is presented in table 3.
For intermediate values of ￿, it turns out that the degree of selection
already existing in the sector22 does not have an e⁄ect on directions
of change (contrary to what happens for f): for insensitive elasticities,
an increase in ￿ ￿ leads to lower average productivity and lower monopoly
power; otherwise, net e⁄ect will be near to zero (making the policy action
completely irrelevant).
More than before, the shape of g(’￿)is crucial when considering
deregulation policies. If g(’￿) is a convex function, then low values
of ￿ are likely to be found in the insensitive region. An increase in
￿ ￿ leads to higher average productivity and higher elasticity, i.e., lower
monopoly power for surviving ￿rms; for su¢ ciently high ￿, the economy
is in the very sensitive region, and e⁄orts to cut down monopoly power
of producers are ine⁄ective; moreover, for intermediate values of ￿, if the
system23 is still located in the insensitive region, a policy maker may be
able to increase ￿ only by allowing less e¢ cient producers to enter the
market (and so to reduce aggregate productivity).
If g(’￿) is concave, a heavily regulated sector is initially located
towards the upper right of the matrix, in which the extreme sensitiveness
of elasticity to the mass of producers tends to make e⁄orts to deregulate
the sector through changes in ￿ ￿ pointless. In this case, a large change in
￿ ￿ may prove necessary in order to exit that region. Even so, the economy
could be placed in the traditional trade-o⁄between less monopoly power
22Or average measured productivity, which is the same in this context.
23This depends on the degree of convexity of g(’￿):
15and lower average productivity. Only when policy makers have managed
to place economy in a high ￿, less sensitive region, deregulation yields
higher productivity together with less monopoly power.
This point makes clear that periods of rapid technological change may
be an ideal context in which these kind of reforms (even a reduction in f
if we are con￿dent about position of the economy) can be implemented:
if the mean productivity of existing producers exogenously increases, ￿
could be increased while reduction in average measured productivity is
avoided or reduced by improvements in technology.
In all cases, it has to be stressed that one fundamental advantage of
this policy is that it allows the economy to run along a new elasticity
curve, for which ￿ is higher than before for every given value of ’￿: for
this reason, the economy is able to escape the trade-o⁄among aggregate
productivity and monopoly power.
5 Policy discussion and conclusions
The two-sector model with heterogenous ￿rms and ￿xed cost of entry
presented above delivers some non-trivial results: ￿rst of all, deregula-
tion policies through an increase in ￿ ￿ (a component of the elasticity of
substitution ￿) are not always a Pareto improvement.
In partial equilibrium, for given values of ￿ out of a de￿ned range,
changes in ￿ ￿ imply redistribution of pro￿ts and workers between (and
within) sectors and ￿rms. In this case, if workers face a reallocation cost,
they could agree with their employers in contrasting deregulation; poli-
cies aiming at requalifying workers could minimize the negative impact
of this transition; in this context a reduction in proportional regulation
cost (b) is preferable as it generates a Pareto improvement.
In general equilibrium the result of any deregulation policy can lead
to some counterintuitive results, in addition to the usual ones, depending
on speci￿c parameter values: if the the other component of the elastic-
ity of substitution ￿, namely function g(’￿), is concave and the sector is
highly regulated, an increase in ￿ ￿ could be ine⁄ective or very expensive
in terms of reduced productivity (and pro￿ts and real wages). This is
especially relevant in developing countries where markets are highly pro-
tected; therefore, when designing "liberalization packages" governments
and international ￿nancial institutions should clearly highlight the over-
all process and phase in social safety nets to absorb the initial negative
impacts on workers of the ￿rst steps towards goods market liberaliza-
tion; this will help reduce social resistance and avoid political backlash
in the pursuit of better economic conditions. This means that dereg-
ulation should be thought of as a strategy where successive steps will
lead to a successful outcome only after a period of possibly negative eco-
16nomic impact. Also, periods of technological improvements should be
used to implement deregulation policies as new technologies dampen the
negative e⁄ects of deregulation on productivity.
Still in general equilibrium, also changes in f (or b) can lead to
counterintuitive results: for highly and sometimes moderately regulated
sectors a reduction in f (or b) does not reduce monopoly power; this
policy works only for already quasi-competitive sectors and always im-
plies a trade-o⁄ between competition and productivity. Therefore, in
the choice of policy instruments, changes in f (or b) would not be good
candidates on their own, but require a careful and balanced policy mix,
as their usage is positive only in very advanced stage of deregulation and
they always imply a trade-o⁄.
Several extensions could be considered. This framework could be
applied to a two-country approach (where one is deregulated and the
other is not): introducing the exchange rate and di⁄erent preferences for
agents of di⁄erent countries we could analyze the impact of a country￿ s
deregulation on the other. The present set up could also be extended
with the introduction of a "transition cost" for workers to consider a
political economy game about the choice whether to deregulate or not.
In addition, a further discussion of the ￿xed regulatory cost could be
considered: we could think of a regulatory cost function in both levels
and variance. For instance, in a multi-country set up, di⁄erent regu-
latory frameworks imply di⁄erent cost function and therefore translate
in di⁄erent geographical costs for multinational ￿rms; a harmonization
process could lead to a reduction in the geographical variance of f (and
in the cost burden for ￿rms). Can the policy maker act on the vari-
ance to gain better results? How can international coordination reduce
uncertainty about f ? This type of issues are increasingly relevant in
view of discussions on the regulatory harmonization process in the Euro-
pean Union regarding information and communications technology, and
in general in economies where agents operate across borders.
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